int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
		unsigned long start, int len, int write, int force,
		struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas)
{
	int i;
	unsigned int vm_flags;

	if (len <= 0)
		return 0;
	/*
	 * Require read or write permissions.
	 * If 'force' is set, we only require the "MAY" flags.
	 */
	vm_flags  = write ? (VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE) : (VM_READ | VM_MAYREAD);
	vm_flags &= force ? (VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE) : (VM_READ | VM_WRITE);
	i = 0;

	do {
		struct vm_area_struct *vma;
		unsigned int foll_flags;

		vma = find_extend_vma(mm, start);
		if (!vma && in_gate_area(tsk, start)) {
			unsigned long pg = start & PAGE_MASK;
			struct vm_area_struct *gate_vma = get_gate_vma(tsk);
			pgd_t *pgd;
			pud_t *pud;
			pmd_t *pmd;
			pte_t *pte;
			if (write) /* user gate pages are read-only */
				return i ? : -EFAULT;
			if (pg > TASK_SIZE)
				pgd = pgd_offset_k(pg);
			else
				pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, pg);
			BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
			pud = pud_offset(pgd, pg);
			BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
			pmd = pmd_offset(pud, pg);
			if (pmd_none(*pmd))
				return i ? : -EFAULT;
			pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, pg);
			if (pte_none(*pte)) {
				pte_unmap(pte);
				return i ? : -EFAULT;
			}
			if (pages) {
				struct page *page = vm_normal_page(gate_vma, start, *pte);
				pages[i] = page;
				if (page)
					get_page(page);
			}
			pte_unmap(pte);
			if (vmas)
				vmas[i] = gate_vma;
			i++;
			start += PAGE_SIZE;
			len--;
			continue;
		}

		if (!vma || (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
				|| !(vm_flags & vma->vm_flags))
			return i ? : -EFAULT;

		if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
			i = follow_hugetlb_page(mm, vma, pages, vmas,
						&start, &len, i, write);
			continue;
		}

		foll_flags = FOLL_TOUCH;
		if (pages)
			foll_flags |= FOLL_GET;
		if (!write && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) &&
		    (!vma->vm_ops || !vma->vm_ops->fault))
			foll_flags |= FOLL_ANON;

		do {
			struct page *page;

			/*
			 * If tsk is ooming, cut off its access to large memory
			 * allocations. It has a pending SIGKILL, but it can't
			 * be processed until returning to user space.
			 */
			if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_MEMDIE)))
				return -ENOMEM;

			if (write)
				foll_flags |= FOLL_WRITE;

			cond_resched();
			while (!(page = follow_page(vma, start, foll_flags))) {
				int ret;
				ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, start,
						foll_flags & FOLL_WRITE);
				if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
					if (ret & VM_FAULT_OOM)
						return i ? i : -ENOMEM;
					else if (ret & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
						return i ? i : -EFAULT;
					BUG();
				}
				if (ret & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)
					tsk->maj_flt++;
				else
					tsk->min_flt++;

				/*
				 * The VM_FAULT_WRITE bit tells us that
				 * do_wp_page has broken COW when necessary,
				 * even if maybe_mkwrite decided not to set
				 * pte_write. We can thus safely do subsequent
				 * page lookups as if they were reads.
				 */
				if (ret & VM_FAULT_WRITE)
					foll_flags &= ~FOLL_WRITE;

				cond_resched();
			}
			if (pages) {
				pages[i] = page;

				flush_anon_page(vma, page, start);
				flush_dcache_page(page);
			}
			if (vmas)
				vmas[i] = vma;
			i++;
			start += PAGE_SIZE;
			len--;
		} while (len && start < vma->vm_end);
	} while (len);
	return i;
}

Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP

KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real empty pages needlessly.

We used to get the ZERO_PAGE when we did the "handle_mm_fault()", but
since fault handling no longer uses ZERO_PAGE for new anonymous pages,
we now need to handle that special case in follow_page() instead.

In particular, the removal of ZERO_PAGE effectively removed the core
file writing optimization where we would skip writing pages that had not
been populated at all, and increased memory pressure a lot by allocating
all those useless newly zeroed pages.

This reinstates the optimization by making the unmapped PTE case the
same as for a non-existent page table, which already did this correctly.

While at it, this also fixes the XIP case for follow_page(), where the
caller could not differentiate between the case of a page that simply
could not be used (because it had no "struct page" associated with it)
and a page that just wasn't mapped.

We do that by simply returning an error pointer for pages that could not
be turned into a "struct page *".  The error is arbitrarily picked to be
EFAULT, since that was what get_user_pages() already used for the
equivalent IO-mapped page case.

[ Also removed an impossible test for pte_offset_map_lock() failing:
  that's not how that function works ]

Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>


void __cpuinit cpu_init (void)
{
	int cpu = stack_smp_processor_id();
	struct tss_struct *t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
	struct orig_ist *orig_ist = &per_cpu(orig_ist, cpu);
	unsigned long v;
	char *estacks = NULL;
	struct task_struct *me;
	int i;

	/* CPU 0 is initialised in head64.c */
	if (cpu != 0) {
		pda_init(cpu);
		zap_low_mappings(cpu);
	} else
		estacks = boot_exception_stacks;

	me = current;

	if (cpu_test_and_set(cpu, cpu_initialized))
		panic("CPU#%d already initialized!\n", cpu);

	printk("Initializing CPU#%d\n", cpu);

	clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_VME|X86_CR4_PVI|X86_CR4_TSD|X86_CR4_DE);

	/*
	 * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT,
	 * and set up the GDT descriptor:
	 */
	if (cpu)
 		memcpy(cpu_gdt(cpu), cpu_gdt_table, GDT_SIZE);

	cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE;
	asm volatile("lgdt %0" :: "m" (cpu_gdt_descr[cpu]));
	asm volatile("lidt %0" :: "m" (idt_descr));

	memset(me->thread.tls_array, 0, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
	syscall_init();

	wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 0);
	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
	barrier();

	check_efer();

	/*
	 * set up and load the per-CPU TSS
	 */
	for (v = 0; v < N_EXCEPTION_STACKS; v++) {
		static const unsigned int order[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS] = {
			[0 ... N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1] = EXCEPTION_STACK_ORDER,
			[DEBUG_STACK - 1] = DEBUG_STACK_ORDER
		};
		if (cpu) {
			estacks = (char *)__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC, order[v]);
			if (!estacks)
				panic("Cannot allocate exception stack %ld %d\n",
				      v, cpu);
		}
		estacks += PAGE_SIZE << order[v];
		orig_ist->ist[v] = t->ist[v] = (unsigned long)estacks;
	}

	t->io_bitmap_base = offsetof(struct tss_struct, io_bitmap);
	/*
	 * <= is required because the CPU will access up to
	 * 8 bits beyond the end of the IO permission bitmap.
	 */
	for (i = 0; i <= IO_BITMAP_LONGS; i++)
		t->io_bitmap[i] = ~0UL;

	atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_count);
	me->active_mm = &init_mm;
	if (me->mm)
		BUG();
	enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, me);

	set_tss_desc(cpu, t);
	load_TR_desc();
	load_LDT(&init_mm.context);

	/*
	 * Clear all 6 debug registers:
	 */

	set_debugreg(0UL, 0);
	set_debugreg(0UL, 1);
	set_debugreg(0UL, 2);
	set_debugreg(0UL, 3);
	set_debugreg(0UL, 6);
	set_debugreg(0UL, 7);

	fpu_init();
}

[PATCH] Don't leak NT bit into next task

SYSENTER can cause a NT to be set which might cause crashes on the IRET
in the next task.

Following similar i386 patch from Linus.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>


static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
				    char __user *optval,
				    int optlen)
{
	struct sctp_authkey *authkey;
	struct sctp_association *asoc;
	int ret;

	if (!sctp_auth_enable)
		return -EACCES;

	if (optlen <= sizeof(struct sctp_authkey))
		return -EINVAL;

	authkey = kmalloc(optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!authkey)
		return -ENOMEM;

	if (copy_from_user(authkey, optval, optlen)) {
		ret = -EFAULT;
		goto out;
	}

	if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) {
		ret = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}

	asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, authkey->sca_assoc_id);
	if (!asoc && authkey->sca_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP)) {
		ret = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}

	ret = sctp_auth_set_key(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, asoc, authkey);
out:
	kfree(authkey);
	return ret;
}

sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key

The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right.  It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).

Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>


static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(
				     const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
				     const struct sctp_association *asoc,
				     const sctp_subtype_t type,
				     void *arg,
				     sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands) {
	static const char err_str[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";

	return sctp_sf_abort_violation(ep, asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
					sizeof(err_str));
}

sctp: Fix kernel panic while process protocol violation parameter

Since call to function sctp_sf_abort_violation() need paramter 'arg' with
'struct sctp_chunk' type, it will read the chunk type and chunk length from
the chunk_hdr member of chunk. But call to sctp_sf_violation_paramlen()
always with 'struct sctp_paramhdr' type's parameter, it will be passed to
sctp_sf_abort_violation(). This may cause kernel panic.

   sctp_sf_violation_paramlen()
     |-- sctp_sf_abort_violation()
        |-- sctp_make_abort_violation()

This patch fixed this problem. This patch also fix two place which called
sctp_sf_violation_paramlen() with wrong paramter type.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>


int hfsplus_find_cat(struct super_block *sb, u32 cnid,
		     struct hfs_find_data *fd)
{
	hfsplus_cat_entry tmp;
	int err;
	u16 type;

	hfsplus_cat_build_key(sb, fd->search_key, cnid, NULL);
	err = hfs_brec_read(fd, &tmp, sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry));
	if (err)
		return err;

	type = be16_to_cpu(tmp.type);
	if (type != HFSPLUS_FOLDER_THREAD && type != HFSPLUS_FILE_THREAD) {
		printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: found bad thread record in catalog\n");
		return -EIO;
	}

	hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni(fd->search_key, be32_to_cpu(tmp.thread.parentID),
				 &tmp.thread.nodeName);
	return hfs_brec_find(fd);
}

hfsplus: fix Buffer overflow with a corrupted image

When an hfsplus image gets corrupted it might happen that the catalog
namelength field gets b0rked.  If we mount such an image the memcpy() in
hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() writes more than the 255 that fit in the name
field.  Depending on the size of the overwritten data, we either only get
memory corruption or also trigger an oops like this:

[  221.628020] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at c82b0000
[  221.629066] IP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
[  221.629066] *pde = 0ea29163 *pte = 082b0160
[  221.629066] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[  221.629066] Modules linked in:
[  221.629066]
[  221.629066] Pid: 4845, comm: mount Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #28)
[  221.629066] EIP: 0060:[<c022d4b1>] EFLAGS: 00010206 CPU: 0
[  221.629066] EIP is at hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
[  221.629066] EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00016210 ECX: 000042c2 EDX: 00000002
[  221.629066] ESI: c82d70ca EDI: c82b0000 EBP: c82d1bcc ESP: c82d199c
[  221.629066]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[  221.629066] Process mount (pid: 4845, ti=c82d1000 task=c8224060 task.ti=c82d1000)
[  221.629066] Stack: c080b3c4 c82aa8f8 c82d19c2 00016210 c080b3be c82d1bd4 c82aa8f0 00000300
[  221.629066]        01000000 750008b1 74006e00 74006900 65006c00 c82d6400 c013bd35 c8224060
[  221.629066]        00000036 00000046 c82d19f0 00000082 c8224548 c8224060 00000036 c0d653cc
[  221.629066] Call Trace:
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c01302d2>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x1b/0x27
[  221.629066]  [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
[  221.629066]  [<c0109e32>] ? save_stack_address+0x0/0x2c
[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[  221.629066]  [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
[  221.629066]  [<c013553d>] ? down+0xc/0x2f
[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c013da5d>] ? mark_held_locks+0x43/0x5a
[  221.629066]  [<c013dc3a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
[  221.629066]  [<c06abec8>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58
[  221.629066]  [<c013555c>] ? down+0x2b/0x2f
[  221.629066]  [<c022aa68>] ? hfsplus_iget+0xa0/0x154
[  221.629066]  [<c022b0b9>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x280/0x447
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[  221.629066]  [<c041c9e4>] ? string+0x2b/0x74
[  221.629066]  [<c041cd16>] ? vsnprintf+0x2e9/0x512
[  221.629066]  [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[  221.629066]  [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
[  221.629066]  [<c01354d3>] ? up+0xc/0x2f
[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c041cfb7>] ? snprintf+0x1b/0x1d
[  221.629066]  [<c01ba466>] ? disk_name+0x25/0x67
[  221.629066]  [<c0183960>] ? get_sb_bdev+0xcd/0x10b
[  221.629066]  [<c016ad92>] ? kstrdup+0x2a/0x4c
[  221.629066]  [<c022a7b3>] ? hfsplus_get_sb+0x13/0x15
[  221.629066]  [<c022ae39>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x0/0x447
[  221.629066]  [<c0183583>] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x3b/0x76
[  221.629066]  [<c0183602>] ? do_kern_mount+0x32/0xba
[  221.629066]  [<c01960d4>] ? do_new_mount+0x46/0x74
[  221.629066]  [<c0196277>] ? do_mount+0x175/0x193
[  221.629066]  [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
[  221.629066]  [<c01663b2>] ? __get_free_pages+0x1e/0x24
[  221.629066]  [<c06ac07b>] ? lock_kernel+0x19/0x8c
[  221.629066]  [<c01962e6>] ? sys_mount+0x51/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c01962f9>] ? sys_mount+0x64/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
[  221.629066]  =======================
[  221.629066] Code: 89 c2 c1 e2 08 c1 e8 08 09 c2 8b 85 e8 fd ff ff 66 89 50 06 89 c7 53 83 c7 08 56 57 68 c4 b3 80 c0 e8 8c 5c ef ff 89 d9 c1 e9 02 <f3> a5 89 d9 83 e1 03 74 02 f3 a4 83 c3 06 8b 95 e8 fd ff ff 0f
[  221.629066] EIP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151 SS:ESP 0068:c82d199c
[  221.629066] ---[ end trace e417a1d67f0d0066 ]---

Since hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() returns void and only has one callsite,
the check is performed at the callsite.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>


int hfsplus_block_allocate(struct super_block *sb, u32 size, u32 offset, u32 *max)
{
	struct page *page;
	struct address_space *mapping;
	__be32 *pptr, *curr, *end;
	u32 mask, start, len, n;
	__be32 val;
	int i;

	len = *max;
	if (!len)
		return size;

	dprint(DBG_BITMAP, "block_allocate: %u,%u,%u\n", size, offset, len);
	mutex_lock(&HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mutex);
	mapping = HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mapping;
	page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS, NULL);
	pptr = kmap(page);
	curr = pptr + (offset & (PAGE_CACHE_BITS - 1)) / 32;
	i = offset % 32;
	offset &= ~(PAGE_CACHE_BITS - 1);
	if ((size ^ offset) / PAGE_CACHE_BITS)
		end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;
	else
		end = pptr + ((size + 31) & (PAGE_CACHE_BITS - 1)) / 32;

	/* scan the first partial u32 for zero bits */
	val = *curr;
	if (~val) {
		n = be32_to_cpu(val);
		mask = (1U << 31) >> i;
		for (; i < 32; mask >>= 1, i++) {
			if (!(n & mask))
				goto found;
		}
	}
	curr++;

	/* scan complete u32s for the first zero bit */
	while (1) {
		while (curr < end) {
			val = *curr;
			if (~val) {
				n = be32_to_cpu(val);
				mask = 1 << 31;
				for (i = 0; i < 32; mask >>= 1, i++) {
					if (!(n & mask))
						goto found;
				}
			}
			curr++;
		}
		kunmap(page);
		offset += PAGE_CACHE_BITS;
		if (offset >= size)
			break;
		page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS,
					 NULL);
		curr = pptr = kmap(page);
		if ((size ^ offset) / PAGE_CACHE_BITS)
			end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;
		else
			end = pptr + ((size + 31) & (PAGE_CACHE_BITS - 1)) / 32;
	}
	dprint(DBG_BITMAP, "bitmap full\n");
	start = size;
	goto out;

found:
	start = offset + (curr - pptr) * 32 + i;
	if (start >= size) {
		dprint(DBG_BITMAP, "bitmap full\n");
		goto out;
	}
	/* do any partial u32 at the start */
	len = min(size - start, len);
	while (1) {
		n |= mask;
		if (++i >= 32)
			break;
		mask >>= 1;
		if (!--len || n & mask)
			goto done;
	}
	if (!--len)
		goto done;
	*curr++ = cpu_to_be32(n);
	/* do full u32s */
	while (1) {
		while (curr < end) {
			n = be32_to_cpu(*curr);
			if (len < 32)
				goto last;
			if (n) {
				len = 32;
				goto last;
			}
			*curr++ = cpu_to_be32(0xffffffff);
			len -= 32;
		}
		set_page_dirty(page);
		kunmap(page);
		offset += PAGE_CACHE_BITS;
		page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS,
					 NULL);
		pptr = kmap(page);
		curr = pptr;
		end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;
	}
last:
	/* do any partial u32 at end */
	mask = 1U << 31;
	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
		if (n & mask)
			break;
		n |= mask;
		mask >>= 1;
	}
done:
	*curr = cpu_to_be32(n);
	set_page_dirty(page);
	kunmap(page);
	*max = offset + (curr - pptr) * 32 + i - start;
	HFSPLUS_SB(sb).free_blocks -= *max;
	sb->s_dirt = 1;
	dprint(DBG_BITMAP, "-> %u,%u\n", start, *max);
out:
	mutex_unlock(&HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mutex);
	return start;
}

hfsplus: check read_mapping_page() return value

While testing more corrupted images with hfsplus, i came across
one which triggered the following bug:

[15840.675016] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffb
[15840.675016] IP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56
[15840.675016] *pde = 00008067 *pte = 00000000
[15840.675016] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[15840.675016] Modules linked in:
[15840.675016]
[15840.675016] Pid: 11575, comm: ln Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #29)
[15840.675016] EIP: 0060:[<c0116a4f>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0
[15840.675016] EIP is at kmap+0x15/0x56
[15840.675016] EAX: 00000246 EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00000000 EDX: cab919c0
[15840.675016] ESI: 000007dd EDI: cab0bcf4 EBP: cab0bc98 ESP: cab0bc94
[15840.675016]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[15840.675016] Process ln (pid: 11575, ti=cab0b000 task=cab919c0 task.ti=cab0b000)
[15840.675016] Stack: 00000000 cab0bcdc c0231cfb 00000000 cab0bce0 00000800 ca9290c0 fffffffb
[15840.675016]        cab145d0 cab919c0 cab15998 22222222 22222222 22222222 00000001 cab15960
[15840.675016]        000007dd cab0bcf4 cab0bd04 c022cb3a cab0bcf4 cab15a6c ca9290c0 00000000
[15840.675016] Call Trace:
[15840.675016]  [<c0231cfb>] ? hfsplus_block_allocate+0x6f/0x2d3
[15840.675016]  [<c022cb3a>] ? hfsplus_file_extend+0xc4/0x1db
[15840.675016]  [<c022ce41>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x8c/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c06adde4>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x9d/0xab
[15840.675016]  [<c019ece6>] ? __block_prepare_write+0x147/0x311
[15840.675016]  [<c0161934>] ? __grab_cache_page+0x52/0x73
[15840.675016]  [<c019ef4f>] ? block_write_begin+0x79/0xd5
[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c019f22a>] ? cont_write_begin+0x27f/0x2af
[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c0139ebe>] ? tick_program_event+0x28/0x4c
[15840.675016]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[15840.675016]  [<c022b723>] ? hfsplus_write_begin+0x2d/0x32
[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c0161988>] ? pagecache_write_begin+0x33/0x107
[15840.675016]  [<c01879e5>] ? __page_symlink+0x3c/0xae
[15840.675016]  [<c019ad34>] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x12f/0x137
[15840.675016]  [<c0187a70>] ? page_symlink+0x19/0x1e
[15840.675016]  [<c022e6eb>] ? hfsplus_symlink+0x41/0xa6
[15840.675016]  [<c01886a9>] ? vfs_symlink+0x99/0x101
[15840.675016]  [<c018a2f6>] ? sys_symlinkat+0x6b/0xad
[15840.675016]  [<c018a348>] ? sys_symlink+0x10/0x12
[15840.675016]  [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
[15840.675016]  =======================
[15840.675016] Code: 00 00 75 10 83 3d 88 2f ec c0 02 75 07 89 d0 e8 12 56 05 00 5d c3 55 ba 06 00 00 00 89 e5 53 89 c3 b8 3d eb 7e c0 e8 16 74 00 00 <8b> 03 c1 e8 1e 69 c0 d8 02 00 00 05 b8 69 8e c0 2b 80 c4 02 00
[15840.675016] EIP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56 SS:ESP 0068:cab0bc94
[15840.675016] ---[ end trace 4fea40dad6b70e5f ]---

This happens because the return value of read_mapping_page() is passed on
to kmap unchecked.  The bug is triggered after the first
read_mapping_page() in hfsplus_block_allocate(), this patch fixes all
three usages in this functions but leaves the ones further down in the
file unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>


static int fuse_ioctl_copy_user(struct page **pages, struct iovec *iov,
			unsigned int nr_segs, size_t bytes, bool to_user)
{
	struct iov_iter ii;
	int page_idx = 0;

	if (!bytes)
		return 0;

	iov_iter_init(&ii, iov, nr_segs, bytes, 0);

	while (iov_iter_count(&ii)) {
		struct page *page = pages[page_idx++];
		size_t todo = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, iov_iter_count(&ii));
		void *kaddr, *map;

		kaddr = map = kmap(page);

		while (todo) {
			char __user *uaddr = ii.iov->iov_base + ii.iov_offset;
			size_t iov_len = ii.iov->iov_len - ii.iov_offset;
			size_t copy = min(todo, iov_len);
			size_t left;

			if (!to_user)
				left = copy_from_user(kaddr, uaddr, copy);
			else
				left = copy_to_user(uaddr, kaddr, copy);

			if (unlikely(left))
				return -EFAULT;

			iov_iter_advance(&ii, copy);
			todo -= copy;
			kaddr += copy;
		}

		kunmap(map);
	}

	return 0;
}

fuse: fix kunmap in fuse_ioctl_copy_user

Looks like another victim of the confusing kmap() vs kmap_atomic() API
differences.

Reported-by: Todor Gyumyushev <yodor1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org


int unlzw(in, out)
    int in, out;    /* input and output file descriptors */
{
    REG2   char_type  *stackp;
    REG3   code_int   code;
    REG4   int        finchar;
    REG5   code_int   oldcode;
    REG6   code_int   incode;
    REG7   long       inbits;
    REG8   long       posbits;
    REG9   int        outpos;
/*  REG10  int        insize; (global) */
    REG11  unsigned   bitmask;
    REG12  code_int   free_ent;
    REG13  code_int   maxcode;
    REG14  code_int   maxmaxcode;
    REG15  int        n_bits;
    REG16  int        rsize;

#ifdef MAXSEG_64K
    tab_prefix[0] = tab_prefix0;
    tab_prefix[1] = tab_prefix1;
#endif
    maxbits = get_byte();
    block_mode = maxbits & BLOCK_MODE;
    if ((maxbits & LZW_RESERVED) != 0) {
	WARN((stderr, "\n%s: %s: warning, unknown flags 0x%x\n",
	      program_name, ifname, maxbits & LZW_RESERVED));
    }
    maxbits &= BIT_MASK;
    maxmaxcode = MAXCODE(maxbits);

    if (maxbits > BITS) {
	fprintf(stderr,
		"\n%s: %s: compressed with %d bits, can only handle %d bits\n",
		program_name, ifname, maxbits, BITS);
	exit_code = ERROR;
	return ERROR;
    }
    rsize = insize;
    maxcode = MAXCODE(n_bits = INIT_BITS)-1;
    bitmask = (1<<n_bits)-1;
    oldcode = -1;
    finchar = 0;
    outpos = 0;
    posbits = inptr<<3;

    free_ent = ((block_mode) ? FIRST : 256);

    clear_tab_prefixof(); /* Initialize the first 256 entries in the table. */

    for (code = 255 ; code >= 0 ; --code) {
	tab_suffixof(code) = (char_type)code;
    }
    do {
	REG1 int i;
	int  e;
	int  o;

    resetbuf:
	e = insize-(o = (posbits>>3));

	for (i = 0 ; i < e ; ++i) {
	    inbuf[i] = inbuf[i+o];
	}
	insize = e;
	posbits = 0;

	if (insize < INBUF_EXTRA) {
	    rsize = read_buffer (in, (char *) inbuf + insize, INBUFSIZ);
	    if (rsize == -1) {
		read_error();
	    }
	    insize += rsize;
	    bytes_in += (off_t)rsize;
	}
	inbits = ((rsize != 0) ? ((long)insize - insize%n_bits)<<3 :
		  ((long)insize<<3)-(n_bits-1));

	while (inbits > posbits) {
	    if (free_ent > maxcode) {
		posbits = ((posbits-1) +
			   ((n_bits<<3)-(posbits-1+(n_bits<<3))%(n_bits<<3)));
		++n_bits;
		if (n_bits == maxbits) {
		    maxcode = maxmaxcode;
		} else {
		    maxcode = MAXCODE(n_bits)-1;
		}
		bitmask = (1<<n_bits)-1;
		goto resetbuf;
	    }
	    input(inbuf,posbits,code,n_bits,bitmask);
	    Tracev((stderr, "%d ", code));

	    if (oldcode == -1) {
		if (256 <= code)
		  gzip_error ("corrupt input.");
		outbuf[outpos++] = (char_type)(finchar = (int)(oldcode=code));
		continue;
	    }
	    if (code == CLEAR && block_mode) {
		clear_tab_prefixof();
		free_ent = FIRST - 1;
		posbits = ((posbits-1) +
			   ((n_bits<<3)-(posbits-1+(n_bits<<3))%(n_bits<<3)));
		maxcode = MAXCODE(n_bits = INIT_BITS)-1;
		bitmask = (1<<n_bits)-1;
		goto resetbuf;
	    }
	    incode = code;
	    stackp = de_stack;

	    if (code >= free_ent) { /* Special case for KwKwK string. */
		if (code > free_ent) {
#ifdef DEBUG
		    char_type *p;

		    posbits -= n_bits;
		    p = &inbuf[posbits>>3];
		    fprintf(stderr,
			    "code:%ld free_ent:%ld n_bits:%d insize:%u\n",
			    code, free_ent, n_bits, insize);
		    fprintf(stderr,
			    "posbits:%ld inbuf:%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n",
			    posbits, p[-1],p[0],p[1],p[2],p[3]);
#endif
		    if (!test && outpos > 0) {
			write_buf(out, (char*)outbuf, outpos);
			bytes_out += (off_t)outpos;
		    }
		    gzip_error (to_stdout
				? "corrupt input."
				: "corrupt input. Use zcat to recover some data.");
		}
		*--stackp = (char_type)finchar;
		code = oldcode;
	    }

	    while ((cmp_code_int)code >= (cmp_code_int)256) {
		/* Generate output characters in reverse order */
		*--stackp = tab_suffixof(code);
		code = tab_prefixof(code);
	    }
	    *--stackp =	(char_type)(finchar = tab_suffixof(code));

	    /* And put them out in forward order */
	    {
		REG1 int	i;

		if (outpos+(i = (de_stack-stackp)) >= OUTBUFSIZ) {
		    do {
			if (i > OUTBUFSIZ-outpos) i = OUTBUFSIZ-outpos;

			if (i > 0) {
			    memcpy(outbuf+outpos, stackp, i);
			    outpos += i;
			}
			if (outpos >= OUTBUFSIZ) {
			    if (!test) {
				write_buf(out, (char*)outbuf, outpos);
				bytes_out += (off_t)outpos;
			    }
			    outpos = 0;
			}
			stackp+= i;
		    } while ((i = (de_stack-stackp)) > 0);
		} else {
		    memcpy(outbuf+outpos, stackp, i);
		    outpos += i;
		}
	    }

	    if ((code = free_ent) < maxmaxcode) { /* Generate the new entry. */

		tab_prefixof(code) = (unsigned short)oldcode;
		tab_suffixof(code) = (char_type)finchar;
		free_ent = code+1;
	    }
	    oldcode = incode;	/* Remember previous code.	*/
	}
    } while (rsize != 0);

    if (!test && outpos > 0) {
	write_buf(out, (char*)outbuf, outpos);
	bytes_out += (off_t)outpos;
    }
    return OK;
}

gzip -d: do not clobber stack for valid input on x86_64

* unlzw.c (unlzw): Avoid integer overflow.
Aki Helin reported the segfault along with an input to trigger the bug.
* NEWS (Bug fixes): Mention it.


vte_sequence_handler_window_manipulation (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
	GdkScreen *gscreen;
	VteScreen *screen;
	GValue *value;
	GtkWidget *widget;
	char buf[128];
	long param, arg1, arg2;
	gint width, height;
	guint i;
	GtkAllocation allocation;

	widget = &terminal->widget;
	screen = terminal->pvt->screen;

	for (i = 0; ((params != NULL) && (i < params->n_values)); i++) {
		arg1 = arg2 = -1;
		if (i + 1 < params->n_values) {
			value = g_value_array_get_nth(params, i + 1);
			if (G_VALUE_HOLDS_LONG(value)) {
				arg1 = g_value_get_long(value);
			}
		}
		if (i + 2 < params->n_values) {
			value = g_value_array_get_nth(params, i + 2);
			if (G_VALUE_HOLDS_LONG(value)) {
				arg2 = g_value_get_long(value);
			}
		}
		value = g_value_array_get_nth(params, i);
		if (!G_VALUE_HOLDS_LONG(value)) {
			continue;
		}
		param = g_value_get_long(value);
		switch (param) {
		case 1:
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Deiconifying window.\n");
			vte_terminal_emit_deiconify_window(terminal);
			break;
		case 2:
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Iconifying window.\n");
			vte_terminal_emit_iconify_window(terminal);
			break;
		case 3:
			if ((arg1 != -1) && (arg2 != -2)) {
				_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
						"Moving window to "
						"%ld,%ld.\n", arg1, arg2);
				vte_terminal_emit_move_window(terminal,
							      arg1, arg2);
				i += 2;
			}
			break;
		case 4:
			if ((arg1 != -1) && (arg2 != -1)) {
				_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
						"Resizing window "
						"(to %ldx%ld pixels).\n",
						arg2, arg1);
				vte_terminal_emit_resize_window(terminal,
								arg2 +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.left +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.right,
								arg1 +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.top +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.bottom);
				i += 2;
			}
			break;
		case 5:
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE, "Raising window.\n");
			vte_terminal_emit_raise_window(terminal);
			break;
		case 6:
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE, "Lowering window.\n");
			vte_terminal_emit_lower_window(terminal);
			break;
		case 7:
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Refreshing window.\n");
			_vte_invalidate_all(terminal);
			vte_terminal_emit_refresh_window(terminal);
			break;
		case 8:
			if ((arg1 != -1) && (arg2 != -1)) {
				_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
						"Resizing window "
						"(to %ld columns, %ld rows).\n",
						arg2, arg1);
				vte_terminal_emit_resize_window(terminal,
								arg2 * terminal->char_width +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.left +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.right,
								arg1 * terminal->char_height +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.top +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.bottom);
				i += 2;
			}
			break;
		case 9:
			switch (arg1) {
			case 0:
				_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
						"Restoring window.\n");
				vte_terminal_emit_restore_window(terminal);
				break;
			case 1:
				_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
						"Maximizing window.\n");
				vte_terminal_emit_maximize_window(terminal);
				break;
			default:
				break;
			}
			i++;
			break;
		case 11:
			/* If we're unmapped, then we're iconified. */
			g_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
				   _VTE_CAP_CSI "%dt",
				   1 + !gtk_widget_get_mapped(widget));
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Reporting window state %s.\n",
					gtk_widget_get_mapped(widget) ?
					"non-iconified" : "iconified");
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		case 13:
			/* Send window location, in pixels. */
			gdk_window_get_origin(gtk_widget_get_window(widget),
					      &width, &height);
			g_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
				   _VTE_CAP_CSI "3;%d;%dt",
				   width + terminal->pvt->inner_border.left,
                                   height + terminal->pvt->inner_border.top);
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Reporting window location"
					"(%d++,%d++).\n",
					width, height);
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		case 14:
			/* Send window size, in pixels. */
			gtk_widget_get_allocation(widget, &allocation);
			g_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
				   _VTE_CAP_CSI "4;%d;%dt",
				   allocation.height -
                                       (terminal->pvt->inner_border.top +
                                        terminal->pvt->inner_border.bottom),
				   allocation.width -
                                       (terminal->pvt->inner_border.left +
                                        terminal->pvt->inner_border.right));
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Reporting window size "
					"(%dx%dn",
					width - (terminal->pvt->inner_border.left + terminal->pvt->inner_border.right),
					height - (terminal->pvt->inner_border.top + terminal->pvt->inner_border.bottom));
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		case 18:
			/* Send widget size, in cells. */
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Reporting widget size.\n");
			g_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
				   _VTE_CAP_CSI "8;%ld;%ldt",
				   terminal->row_count,
				   terminal->column_count);
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		case 19:
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Reporting screen size.\n");
			gscreen = gtk_widget_get_screen(widget);
			height = gdk_screen_get_height(gscreen);
			width = gdk_screen_get_width(gscreen);
			g_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
				   _VTE_CAP_CSI "9;%ld;%ldt",
				   height / terminal->char_height,
				   width / terminal->char_width);
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		case 20:
			/* Report the icon title. */
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
				"Reporting icon title.\n");
			g_snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
				    _VTE_CAP_OSC "L%s" _VTE_CAP_ST,
				    terminal->icon_title);
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		case 21:
			/* Report the window title. */
			_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
					"Reporting window title.\n");
			g_snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
				    _VTE_CAP_OSC "l%s" _VTE_CAP_ST,
				    terminal->window_title);
			vte_terminal_feed_child(terminal, buf, -1);
			break;
		default:
			if (param >= 24) {
				_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_PARSE,
						"Resizing to %ld rows.\n",
					       	param);
				/* Resize to the specified number of
				 * rows. */
				vte_terminal_emit_resize_window(terminal,
								terminal->column_count * terminal->char_width +
                                                                terminal->pvt->inner_border.left +
                                                                terminal->pvt->inner_border.right,
								param * terminal->char_height +
								terminal->pvt->inner_border.top +
                                                                terminal->pvt->inner_border.bottom);
			}
			break;
		}
	}
}

Fix terminal title reporting

Fixed CVE-2003-0070 again.
See also http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=104612710031920&w=2 .
(cherry picked from commit 6042c75b5a6daa0e499e61c8e07242d890d38ff1)


bmexec_trans (kwset_t kwset, char const *text, size_t size)
{
  unsigned char const *d1;
  char const *ep, *sp, *tp;
  int d;
  int len = kwset->mind;
  char const *trans = kwset->trans;

  if (len == 0)
    return 0;
  if (len > size)
    return -1;
  if (len == 1)
    {
      tp = memchr_kwset (text, size, kwset);
      return tp ? tp - text : -1;
    }

  d1 = kwset->delta;
  sp = kwset->target + len;
  tp = text + len;
  char gc1 = kwset->gc1;
  char gc2 = kwset->gc2;

  /* Significance of 12: 1 (initial offset) + 10 (skip loop) + 1 (md2). */
  if (size > 12 * len)
    /* 11 is not a bug, the initial offset happens only once. */
    for (ep = text + size - 11 * len; tp <= ep; )
      {
        char const *tp0 = tp;
        d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
        d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
        if (d != 0)
          {
            d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
            d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
            d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
            if (d != 0)
              {
                d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
                d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
                d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
                if (d != 0)
                  {
                    d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
                    d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;

                    /* As a heuristic, prefer memchr to seeking by
                       delta1 when the latter doesn't advance much.  */
                    int advance_heuristic = 16 * sizeof (long);
                    if (advance_heuristic <= tp - tp0)
                      goto big_advance;
                    tp--;
                    tp = memchr_kwset (tp, text + size - tp, kwset);
                    if (! tp)
                      return -1;
                    tp++;
                  }
              }
          }
        if (bm_delta2_search (&tp, ep, sp, len, trans, gc1, gc2, d1, kwset))
          return tp - text;
      big_advance:;
      }

  /* Now we have only a few characters left to search.  We
     carefully avoid ever producing an out-of-bounds pointer. */
  ep = text + size;
  d = d1[U(tp[-1])];
  while (d <= ep - tp)
    {
      d = d1[U((tp += d)[-1])];
      if (d != 0)
        continue;
      if (bm_delta2_search (&tp, ep, sp, len, trans, gc1, gc2, NULL, kwset))
        return tp - text;
    }

  return -1;
}

grep -F: fix a heap buffer (read) overrun

grep's read buffer is often filled to its full size, except when
reading the final buffer of a file.  In that case, the number of
bytes read may be far less than the size of the buffer.  However, for
certain unusual pattern/text combinations, grep -F would mistakenly
examine bytes in that uninitialized region of memory when searching
for a match.  With carefully chosen inputs, one can cause grep -F to
read beyond the end of that buffer altogether.  This problem arose via
commit v2.18-90-g73893ff with the introduction of a more efficient
heuristic using what is now the memchr_kwset function. The use of
that function in bmexec_trans could leave TP much larger than EP,
and the subsequent call to bm_delta2_search would mistakenly access
beyond end of the main input read buffer.

* src/kwset.c (bmexec_trans): When TP reaches or exceeds EP,
do not call bm_delta2_search.
* tests/kwset-abuse: New file.
* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add it.
* THANKS.in: Update.
* NEWS (Bug fixes): Mention it.

Prior to this patch, this command would trigger a UMR:

  printf %0360db 0 | valgrind src/grep -F $(printf %019dXb 0)

  Use of uninitialised value of size 8
     at 0x4142BE: bmexec_trans (kwset.c:657)
     by 0x4143CA: bmexec (kwset.c:678)
     by 0x414973: kwsexec (kwset.c:848)
     by 0x414DC4: Fexecute (kwsearch.c:128)
     by 0x404E2E: grepbuf (grep.c:1238)
     by 0x4054BF: grep (grep.c:1417)
     by 0x405CEB: grepdesc (grep.c:1645)
     by 0x405EC1: grep_command_line_arg (grep.c:1692)
     by 0x4077D4: main (grep.c:2570)

See the accompanying test for how to trigger the heap buffer overrun.

Thanks to Nima Aghdaii for testing and finding numerous
ways to break early iterations of this patch.


void cgit_print_http_headers(void)
{
	if (ctx.env.no_http && !strcmp(ctx.env.no_http, "1"))
		return;

	if (ctx.page.status)
		htmlf("Status: %d %s\n", ctx.page.status, ctx.page.statusmsg);
	if (ctx.page.mimetype && ctx.page.charset)
		htmlf("Content-Type: %s; charset=%s\n", ctx.page.mimetype,
		      ctx.page.charset);
	else if (ctx.page.mimetype)
		htmlf("Content-Type: %s\n", ctx.page.mimetype);
	if (ctx.page.size)
		htmlf("Content-Length: %zd\n", ctx.page.size);
	if (ctx.page.filename)
		htmlf("Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"%s\"\n",
		      ctx.page.filename);
	if (!ctx.env.authenticated)
		html("Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store\n");
	htmlf("Last-Modified: %s\n", http_date(ctx.page.modified));
	htmlf("Expires: %s\n", http_date(ctx.page.expires));
	if (ctx.page.etag)
		htmlf("ETag: \"%s\"\n", ctx.page.etag);
	html("\n");
	if (ctx.env.request_method && !strcmp(ctx.env.request_method, "HEAD"))
		exit(0);
}

ui-shared: prevent malicious filename from injecting headers


ecc_256_modp (const struct ecc_modulo *p, mp_limb_t *rp)
{
  mp_limb_t u1, u0;
  mp_size_t n;

  n = 2*p->size;
  u1 = rp[--n];
  u0 = rp[n-1];

  /* This is not particularly fast, but should work well with assembly implementation. */
  for (; n >= p->size; n--)
    {
      mp_limb_t q2, q1, q0, t, cy;

      /* <q2, q1, q0> = v * u1 + <u1,u0>, with v = 2^32 - 1:

	   +---+---+
	   | u1| u0|
	   +---+---+
	       |-u1|
	     +-+-+-+
	     | u1|
       +---+-+-+-+-+
       | q2| q1| q0|
       +---+---+---+
      */
      q1 = u1 - (u1 > u0);
      q0 = u0 - u1;
      t = u1 << 32;
      q0 += t;
      t = (u1 >> 32) + (q0 < t) + 1;
      q1 += t;
      q2 = q1 < t;

      /* Compute candidate remainder */
      u1 = u0 + (q1 << 32) - q1;
      t = -(mp_limb_t) (u1 > q0);
      u1 -= t & 0xffffffff;
      q1 += t;
      q2 += t + (q1 < t);

      assert (q2 < 2);

      /* We multiply by two low limbs of p, 2^96 - 1, so we could use
	 shifts rather than mul. */
      t = mpn_submul_1 (rp + n - 4, p->m, 2, q1);
      t += cnd_sub_n (q2, rp + n - 3, p->m, 1);
      t += (-q2) & 0xffffffff;

      u0 = rp[n-2];
      cy = (u0 < t);
      u0 -= t;
      t = (u1 < cy);
      u1 -= cy;
      u1 += cnd_add_n (t, rp + n - 4, p->m, 3);
      u1 -= (-t) & 0xffffffff;
    }
  rp[2] = u0;
  rp[3] = u1;
}

Fixed miscomputation bugs in secp-256r1 modulo functions.


extract_group_icon_cursor_resource(WinLibrary *fi, WinResource *wr, char *lang,
                                   int *ressize, bool is_icon)
{
	Win32CursorIconDir *icondir;
	Win32CursorIconFileDir *fileicondir;
	char *memory;
	int c, size, offset, skipped;

	/* get resource data and size */
	icondir = (Win32CursorIconDir *) get_resource_entry(fi, wr, &size);
	if (icondir == NULL) {
		/* get_resource_entry will print error */
		return NULL;
	}

	/* calculate total size of output file */
	RETURN_IF_BAD_POINTER(NULL, icondir->count);
	skipped = 0;
	for (c = 0 ; c < icondir->count ; c++) {
		int level;
	    	int iconsize;
		char name[14];
		WinResource *fwr;

		RETURN_IF_BAD_POINTER(NULL, icondir->entries[c]);
		/*printf("%d. bytes_in_res=%d width=%d height=%d planes=%d bit_count=%d\n", c,
			icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res,
			(is_icon ? icondir->entries[c].res_info.icon.width : icondir->entries[c].res_info.cursor.width),
			(is_icon ? icondir->entries[c].res_info.icon.height : icondir->entries[c].res_info.cursor.height),
			icondir->entries[c].plane_count,
			icondir->entries[c].bit_count);*/

		/* find the corresponding icon resource */
		snprintf(name, sizeof(name)/sizeof(char), "-%d", icondir->entries[c].res_id);
		fwr = find_resource(fi, (is_icon ? "-3" : "-1"), name, lang, &level);
		if (fwr == NULL) {
			warn(_("%s: could not find `%s' in `%s' resource."),
			 	fi->name, &name[1], (is_icon ? "group_icon" : "group_cursor"));
			return NULL;
		}

		if (get_resource_entry(fi, fwr, &iconsize) != NULL) {
		    if (iconsize == 0) {
			warn(_("%s: icon resource `%s' is empty, skipping"), fi->name, name);
			skipped++;
			continue;
		    }
		    if (iconsize != icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res) {
			warn(_("%s: mismatch of size in icon resource `%s' and group (%d vs %d)"), fi->name, name, iconsize, icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res);
		    }
		    size += iconsize < icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res ? icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res : iconsize;

		    /* cursor resources have two additional WORDs that contain
		     * hotspot info */
		    if (!is_icon)
			size -= sizeof(uint16_t)*2;
		}
	}
	offset = sizeof(Win32CursorIconFileDir) + (icondir->count-skipped) * sizeof(Win32CursorIconFileDirEntry);
	size += offset;
	*ressize = size;

	/* allocate that much memory */
	memory = xmalloc(size);
	fileicondir = (Win32CursorIconFileDir *) memory;

	/* transfer Win32CursorIconDir structure members */
	fileicondir->reserved = icondir->reserved;
	fileicondir->type = icondir->type;
	fileicondir->count = icondir->count - skipped;

	/* transfer each cursor/icon: Win32CursorIconDirEntry and data */
	skipped = 0;
	for (c = 0 ; c < icondir->count ; c++) {
		int level;
		char name[14];
		WinResource *fwr;
		char *data;

		/* find the corresponding icon resource */
		snprintf(name, sizeof(name)/sizeof(char), "-%d", icondir->entries[c].res_id);
		fwr = find_resource(fi, (is_icon ? "-3" : "-1"), name, lang, &level);
		if (fwr == NULL) {
			warn(_("%s: could not find `%s' in `%s' resource."),
			 	fi->name, &name[1], (is_icon ? "group_icon" : "group_cursor"));
			return NULL;
		}

		/* get data and size of that resource */
		data = get_resource_entry(fi, fwr, &size);
		if (data == NULL) {
			/* get_resource_entry has printed error */
			return NULL;
		}
    	    	if (size == 0) {
		    skipped++;
		    continue;
		}

		/* copy ICONDIRENTRY (not including last dwImageOffset) */
		memcpy(&fileicondir->entries[c-skipped], &icondir->entries[c],
			sizeof(Win32CursorIconFileDirEntry)-sizeof(uint32_t));

		/* special treatment for cursors */
		if (!is_icon) {
			fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].width = icondir->entries[c].res_info.cursor.width;
			fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].height = icondir->entries[c].res_info.cursor.height / 2;
			fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].color_count = 0;
			fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].reserved = 0;
		}

		/* set image offset and increase it */
		fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].dib_offset = offset;

		/* transfer resource into file memory */
		if (is_icon) {
			memcpy(&memory[offset], data, icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res);
		} else {
			fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].hotspot_x = ((uint16_t *) data)[0];
			fileicondir->entries[c-skipped].hotspot_y = ((uint16_t *) data)[1];
			memcpy(&memory[offset], data+sizeof(uint16_t)*2,
				   icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res-sizeof(uint16_t)*2);
			offset -= sizeof(uint16_t)*2;
		}

		/* increase the offset pointer */
		offset += icondir->entries[c].bytes_in_res;
	}

	return (void *) memory;
}

prevent access to unallocated memory in wrestool (BZ #1249276)


load_image (const gchar  *filename,
            GError      **error)
{
  FILE     *fp;
  tga_info  info;
  guchar    header[18];
  guchar    footer[26];
  guchar    extension[495];
  long      offset;
  gint32    image_ID = -1;

  gimp_progress_init_printf (_("Opening '%s'"),
                             gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));

  fp = g_fopen (filename, "rb");

  if (! fp)
    {
      g_set_error (error, G_FILE_ERROR, g_file_error_from_errno (errno),
                   _("Could not open '%s' for reading: %s"),
                   gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename), g_strerror (errno));
      return -1;
    }

  /* Is file big enough for a footer? */
  if (!fseek (fp, -26L, SEEK_END))
    {
      if (fread (footer, sizeof (footer), 1, fp) != 1)
        {
          g_message (_("Cannot read footer from '%s'"),
                     gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));
          return -1;
        }
      else if (memcmp (footer + 8, magic, sizeof (magic)) == 0)
        {
          /* Check the signature. */

          offset = (footer[0]          +
                    footer[1] * 256L   +
                    footer[2] * 65536L +
                    footer[3] * 16777216L);

          if (offset != 0)
            {
              if (fseek (fp, offset, SEEK_SET) ||
                  fread (extension, sizeof (extension), 1, fp) != 1)
                {
                  g_message (_("Cannot read extension from '%s'"),
                             gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));
                  return -1;
                }
              /* Eventually actually handle version 2 TGA here */
            }
        }
    }

  if (fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET) ||
      fread (header, sizeof (header), 1, fp) != 1)
    {
      g_message (_("Cannot read header from '%s'"),
                 gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));
      return -1;
    }

  switch (header[2])
    {
    case 1:
      info.imageType        = TGA_TYPE_MAPPED;
      info.imageCompression = TGA_COMP_NONE;
      break;
    case 2:
      info.imageType        = TGA_TYPE_COLOR;
      info.imageCompression = TGA_COMP_NONE;
      break;
    case 3:
      info.imageType        = TGA_TYPE_GRAY;
      info.imageCompression = TGA_COMP_NONE;
      break;

    case 9:
      info.imageType        = TGA_TYPE_MAPPED;
      info.imageCompression = TGA_COMP_RLE;
      break;
    case 10:
      info.imageType        = TGA_TYPE_COLOR;
      info.imageCompression = TGA_COMP_RLE;
      break;
    case 11:
      info.imageType        = TGA_TYPE_GRAY;
      info.imageCompression = TGA_COMP_RLE;
      break;

    default:
      info.imageType = 0;
    }

  info.idLength     = header[0];
  info.colorMapType = header[1];

  info.colorMapIndex  = header[3] + header[4] * 256;
  info.colorMapLength = header[5] + header[6] * 256;
  info.colorMapSize   = header[7];

  info.xOrigin = header[8]  + header[9] * 256;
  info.yOrigin = header[10] + header[11] * 256;
  info.width   = header[12] + header[13] * 256;
  info.height  = header[14] + header[15] * 256;

  info.bpp       = header[16];
  info.bytes     = (info.bpp + 7) / 8;
  info.alphaBits = header[17] & 0x0f; /* Just the low 4 bits */
  info.flipHoriz = (header[17] & 0x10) ? 1 : 0;
  info.flipVert  = (header[17] & 0x20) ? 0 : 1;

  /* hack to handle some existing files with incorrect headers, see bug #306675 */
  if (info.alphaBits == info.bpp)
    info.alphaBits = 0;

  /* hack to handle yet another flavor of incorrect headers, see bug #540969 */
  if (info.alphaBits == 0)
    {
      if (info.imageType == TGA_TYPE_COLOR && info.bpp == 32)
        info.alphaBits = 8;

      if (info.imageType == TGA_TYPE_GRAY && info.bpp == 16)
        info.alphaBits = 8;
    }

  switch (info.imageType)
    {
      case TGA_TYPE_MAPPED:
        if (info.bpp != 8)
          {
            g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u)",
                       gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename),
                       info.imageType, info.bpp);
            return -1;
          }
        break;
      case TGA_TYPE_COLOR:
        if (info.bpp != 15 && info.bpp != 16 &&
            info.bpp != 24 && info.bpp != 32)
          {
            g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u)",
                       gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename),
                       info.imageType, info.bpp);
            return -1;
          }
        break;
      case TGA_TYPE_GRAY:
        if (info.bpp != 8 &&
            (info.alphaBits != 8 || (info.bpp != 16 && info.bpp != 15)))
          {
            g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u)",
                       gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename),
                       info.imageType, info.bpp);
            return -1;
          }
        break;

      default:
        g_message ("Unknown image type %u for '%s'",
                   info.imageType, gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));
        return -1;
    }

  /* Plausible but unhandled formats */
  if (info.bytes * 8 != info.bpp && info.bpp != 15)
    {
      g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u)",
                 gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename),
                 info.imageType, info.bpp);
      return -1;
    }

  /* Check that we have a color map only when we need it. */
  if (info.imageType == TGA_TYPE_MAPPED && info.colorMapType != 1)
    {
      g_message ("Indexed image has invalid color map type %u",
                 info.colorMapType);
      return -1;
    }
  else if (info.imageType != TGA_TYPE_MAPPED && info.colorMapType != 0)
    {
      g_message ("Non-indexed image has invalid color map type %u",
                 info.colorMapType);
      return -1;
    }

  /* Skip the image ID field. */
  if (info.idLength && fseek (fp, info.idLength, SEEK_CUR))
    {
      g_message ("File '%s' is truncated or corrupted",
                 gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));
      return -1;
    }

  image_ID = ReadImage (fp, &info, filename);

  fclose (fp);

  return image_ID;
}

Bug 739134 - (CVE-2017-17786) Out of bounds read / heap overflow in...

... TGA importer.

Be more thorough on valid TGA RGB and RGBA images.
In particular current TGA plug-in can import RGBA as 32 bits (8 bits per
channel) and 16 bits (5 bits per color channel and 1 bit for alpha), and
RGB as 15 and 24 bits.
Maybe there exist more variants, but if they do exist, we simply don't
support them yet.

Thanks to Hanno Böck for the report and a first patch attempt.


pax_decode_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
  if (file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0)
    {
      uintmax_t u;
      char nbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
      union block *blk;
      char *p;
      size_t i;
      off_t start;

#define COPY_BUF(b,buf,src) do                                     \
 {                                                                 \
   char *endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE;                             \
   char *dst = buf;                                                \
   do                                                              \
     {                                                             \
       if (dst == buf + UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND -1)                  \
         {                                                         \
           ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: numeric overflow in sparse archive member"), \
	          file->stat_info->orig_file_name));               \
           return false;                                           \
         }                                                         \
       if (src == endp)                                            \
	 {                                                         \
	   set_next_block_after (b);                               \
           b = find_next_block ();                                 \
           src = b->buffer;                                        \
	   endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE;                           \
	 }                                                         \
       *dst = *src++;                                              \
     }                                                             \
   while (*dst++ != '\n');                                         \
   dst[-1] = 0;                                                    \
 } while (0)

      start = current_block_ordinal ();
      set_next_block_after (current_header);
      blk = find_next_block ();
      p = blk->buffer;
      COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
      if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (size_t)))
	{
	  ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
		  file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
	  return false;
	}
      file->stat_info->sparse_map_size = u;
      file->stat_info->sparse_map = xcalloc (file->stat_info->sparse_map_size,
					     sizeof (*file->stat_info->sparse_map));
      file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0;
      for (i = 0; i < file->stat_info->sparse_map_size; i++)
	{
	  struct sp_array sp;

	  COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
	  if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
	    {
	      ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
		      file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
	      return false;
	    }
	  sp.offset = u;
	  COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
	  if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
	    {
	      ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
		      file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
	      return false;
	    }
	  sp.numbytes = u;
	  sparse_add_map (file->stat_info, &sp);
	}
      set_next_block_after (blk);

      file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE * (current_block_ordinal () - start);
    }

  return true;
}

Fix possible NULL dereference (savannah bug #55369)

* src/sparse.c (pax_decode_header): Check return from find_next_block.


    kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
{
    krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
    krb5_keytab 		krb5keytab = NULL;
    krb5_keytab_entry           entry;
    krb5_principal              princ = NULL;
    krb5_error_code  		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
    int rc = 0;

    if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
        return(0);

    /*	kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
    */
    if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
    {
        krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
                                  &krb5keytab);
        if (krb5rc)
            goto exit;
    }
    else
    {
        krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context,&krb5keytab);
        if (krb5rc)
            goto exit;
    }

    /* the host key we are looking for */
    krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
                                     kssl_ctx->service_name ? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
                                     KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ);

    krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
                                princ,
                                0 /* IGNORE_VNO */,
                                0 /* IGNORE_ENCTYPE */,
                                &entry);
    if ( krb5rc == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND ) {
        rc = 1;
        goto exit;
    } else if ( krb5rc )
        goto exit;

    krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &entry);
    rc = 1;

  exit:
    if (krb5keytab)     krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
    if (princ)          krb5_free_principal(krb5context, princ);
    if (krb5context)	krb5_free_context(krb5context);
    return(rc);
}

Submitted by: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>

Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).


int sftp_mkdir(sftp_session sftp, const char *directory, mode_t mode) {
  sftp_status_message status = NULL;
  sftp_message msg = NULL;
  sftp_attributes errno_attr = NULL;
  struct sftp_attributes_struct attr;
  ssh_buffer buffer;
  ssh_string path;
  uint32_t id;

  buffer = ssh_buffer_new();
  if (buffer == NULL) {
    ssh_set_error_oom(sftp->session);
    return -1;
  }

  path = ssh_string_from_char(directory);
  if (path == NULL) {
    ssh_set_error_oom(sftp->session);
    ssh_buffer_free(buffer);
    return -1;
  }

  ZERO_STRUCT(attr);
  attr.permissions = mode;
  attr.flags = SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;

  id = sftp_get_new_id(sftp);
  if (buffer_add_u32(buffer, id) < 0 ||
      buffer_add_ssh_string(buffer, path) < 0 ||
      buffer_add_attributes(buffer, &attr) < 0 ||
      sftp_packet_write(sftp, SSH_FXP_MKDIR, buffer) < 0) {
    ssh_buffer_free(buffer);
    ssh_string_free(path);
  }
  ssh_buffer_free(buffer);
  ssh_string_free(path);

  while (msg == NULL) {
    if (sftp_read_and_dispatch(sftp) < 0) {
      return -1;
    }
    msg = sftp_dequeue(sftp, id);
  }

  /* By specification, this command only returns SSH_FXP_STATUS */
  if (msg->packet_type == SSH_FXP_STATUS) {
    status = parse_status_msg(msg);
    sftp_message_free(msg);
    if (status == NULL) {
      return -1;
    }
    sftp_set_error(sftp, status->status);
    switch (status->status) {
      case SSH_FX_FAILURE:
        /*
         * mkdir always returns a failure, even if the path already exists.
         * To be POSIX conform and to be able to map it to EEXIST a stat
         * call is needed here.
         */
        errno_attr = sftp_lstat(sftp, directory);
        if (errno_attr != NULL) {
          SAFE_FREE(errno_attr);
          sftp_set_error(sftp, SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS);
        }
        break;
      case SSH_FX_OK:
        status_msg_free(status);
        return 0;
        break;
      default:
        break;
    }
    /*
     * The status should be SSH_FX_OK if the command was successful, if it
     * didn't, then there was an error
     */
    ssh_set_error(sftp->session, SSH_REQUEST_DENIED,
        "SFTP server: %s", status->errormsg);
    status_msg_free(status);
    return -1;
  } else {
    ssh_set_error(sftp->session, SSH_FATAL,
        "Received message %d when attempting to make directory",
        msg->packet_type);
    sftp_message_free(msg);
  }

  return -1;
}

sftp: Fix bug in sftp_mkdir not returning on error.

resolves: #84
(cherry picked from commit a92c97b2e17715c1b3cdd693d14af6c3311d8e44)


BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
{
    int i, j;
    BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL, *etmp = NULL, *bio = NULL;
    unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
    X509_ALGOR *xa;
    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = NULL;
    const EVP_MD *evp_md;
    const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
    X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = NULL;
    STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;

    if (p7 == NULL) {
        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
        return NULL;
    }

    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
        return NULL;
    }

    i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
    p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;

    switch (i) {
    case NID_pkcs7_signed:
        data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
        md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
        break;
    case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
        rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
        md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
        data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
        enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
        evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
        if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
                     PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
            goto err;
        }
        break;
    case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
        rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
        enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
        data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
        evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
        if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
                     PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
            goto err;
        }
        break;
    default:
        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
        goto err;
    }

    /* We will be checking the signature */
    if (md_sk != NULL) {
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
            xa = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i);
            if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
                goto err;
            }

            j = OBJ_obj2nid(xa->algorithm);
            evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(j);
            if (evp_md == NULL) {
                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
                         PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
                goto err;
            }

            BIO_set_md(btmp, evp_md);
            if (out == NULL)
                out = btmp;
            else
                BIO_push(out, btmp);
            btmp = NULL;
        }
    }

    if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
#if 0
        unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
        unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
        unsigned char *p;
        int keylen, ivlen;
        int max;
        X509_OBJECT ret;
#endif
        unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
        int tkeylen;
        int jj;

        if ((etmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
            goto err;
        }

        /*
         * It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key with the
         * private key
         */

        /*
         * Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate (if
         * any)
         */

        if (pcert) {
            for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
                ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
                if (!pkcs7_cmp_ri(ri, pcert))
                    break;
                ri = NULL;
            }
            if (ri == NULL) {
                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
                         PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
                goto err;
            }
        }

        jj = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
        tmp = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(jj + 10);
        if (tmp == NULL) {
            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto err;
        }

        /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */

        if (pcert == NULL) {
            /*
             * Temporary storage in case EVP_PKEY_decrypt overwrites output
             * buffer on error.
             */
            unsigned char *tmp2;
            tmp2 = OPENSSL_malloc(jj);
            if (!tmp2)
                goto err;
            jj = -1;
            /*
             * Always attempt to decrypt all cases to avoid leaking timing
             * information about a successful decrypt.
             */
            for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
                int tret;
                ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
                tret = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp2,
                                        M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
                                        M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
                                        pkey);
                if (tret > 0) {
                    memcpy(tmp, tmp2, tret);
                    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, tret);
                    jj = tret;
                }
                ERR_clear_error();
            }
            OPENSSL_free(tmp2);
        } else {
            jj = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
                                  M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
                                  M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey);
            ERR_clear_error();
        }

        evp_ctx = NULL;
        BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp, &evp_ctx);
        if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0)
            goto err;
        if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
            goto err;
        /* Generate random key to counter MMA */
        tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
        tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
        if (!tkey)
            goto err;
        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
            goto err;
        /* If we have no key use random key */
        if (jj <= 0) {
            OPENSSL_free(tmp);
            jj = tkeylen;
            tmp = tkey;
            tkey = NULL;
        }

        if (jj != tkeylen) {
            /*
             * Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key and effective key
             * length. The key length is determined by the size of the
             * decrypted RSA key.
             */
            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, jj)) {
                /* As MMA defence use random key instead */
                OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj);
                OPENSSL_free(tmp);
                jj = tkeylen;
                tmp = tkey;
                tkey = NULL;
            }
        }
        ERR_clear_error();
        if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, tmp, NULL, 0) <= 0)
            goto err;

        OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj);

        if (tkey) {
            OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
            OPENSSL_free(tkey);
        }

        if (out == NULL)
            out = etmp;
        else
            BIO_push(out, etmp);
        etmp = NULL;
    }
#if 1
    if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL)) {
        bio = in_bio;
    } else {
# if 0
        bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
        /*
         * We need to set this so that when we have read all the data, the
         * encrypt BIO, if present, will read EOF and encode the last few
         * bytes
         */
        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);

        if (data_body->length > 0)
            BIO_write(bio, (char *)data_body->data, data_body->length);
# else
        if (data_body->length > 0)
            bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
        else {
            bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
        }
        if (bio == NULL)
            goto err;
# endif
    }
    BIO_push(out, bio);
    bio = NULL;
#endif
    if (0) {
 err:
        if (out != NULL)
            BIO_free_all(out);
        if (btmp != NULL)
            BIO_free_all(btmp);
        if (etmp != NULL)
            BIO_free_all(etmp);
        if (bio != NULL)
            BIO_free_all(bio);
        out = NULL;
    }
    if (tmp != NULL)
        OPENSSL_free(tmp);
    return (out);
}

PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.

CVE-2015-1790

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>


int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
    int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
    long n;
    const unsigned char *p;
    unsigned char *d;

    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
                                   SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);

    if (!ok)
        return ((int)n);

    if (n < 6) {
        /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
        goto f_err;
    }

    p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
    n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
    n2s(p, ticklen);
    /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
    if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
        goto f_err;
    }
    if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
        OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
        s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
    }
    s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
    if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }
    memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
    s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
    /*
     * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
     * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
     * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
     * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
     * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
     * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
     * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
     * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
     * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
     */
    EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
               s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
               EVP_sha256(), NULL);
# else
               EVP_sha1(), NULL);
# endif
    ret = 1;
    return (ret);
 f_err:
    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
 err:
    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
    return (-1);
}

Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket

If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.

CVE-2015-1791

This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.

Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27c76b9b8010b536687318739c6f631ce4194688)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssl_err.c


SCM_DEFINE (scm_mkdir, "mkdir", 1, 1, 0,
            (SCM path, SCM mode),
	    "Create a new directory named by @var{path}.  If @var{mode} is omitted\n"
	    "then the permissions of the directory file are set using the current\n"
	    "umask.  Otherwise they are set to the decimal value specified with\n"
	    "@var{mode}.  The return value is unspecified.")
#define FUNC_NAME s_scm_mkdir
{
  int rv;
  mode_t mask;

  if (SCM_UNBNDP (mode))
    {
      mask = umask (0);
      umask (mask);
      STRING_SYSCALL (path, c_path, rv = mkdir (c_path, 0777 ^ mask));
    }
  else
    {
      STRING_SYSCALL (path, c_path, rv = mkdir (c_path, scm_to_uint (mode)));
    }
  if (rv != 0)
    SCM_SYSERROR;
  return SCM_UNSPECIFIED;
}

Remove 'umask' calls from 'mkdir'.

Fixes <http://bugs.gnu.org/24659>.

* libguile/filesys.c (SCM_DEFINE): Remove calls to 'umask' when MODE is
unbound; instead, use 0777 as the mode.  Update docstring to clarify
this.
* doc/ref/posix.texi (File System): Adjust accordingly.
* NEWS: Mention it.


auth_request_get_var_expand_table_full(const struct auth_request *auth_request,
				       auth_request_escape_func_t *escape_func,
				       unsigned int *count)
{
	const unsigned int auth_count =
		N_ELEMENTS(auth_request_var_expand_static_tab);
	struct var_expand_table *tab, *ret_tab;
	const char *orig_user, *auth_user;

	if (escape_func == NULL)
		escape_func = escape_none;

	/* keep the extra fields at the beginning. the last static_tab field
	   contains the ending NULL-fields. */
	tab = ret_tab = t_malloc((*count + auth_count) * sizeof(*tab));
	memset(tab, 0, *count * sizeof(*tab));
	tab += *count;
	*count += auth_count;

	memcpy(tab, auth_request_var_expand_static_tab,
	       auth_count * sizeof(*tab));

	tab[0].value = escape_func(auth_request->user, auth_request);
	tab[1].value = escape_func(t_strcut(auth_request->user, '@'),
				   auth_request);
	tab[2].value = strchr(auth_request->user, '@');
	if (tab[2].value != NULL)
		tab[2].value = escape_func(tab[2].value+1, auth_request);
	tab[3].value = escape_func(auth_request->service, auth_request);
	/* tab[4] = we have no home dir */
	if (auth_request->local_ip.family != 0)
		tab[5].value = net_ip2addr(&auth_request->local_ip);
	if (auth_request->remote_ip.family != 0)
		tab[6].value = net_ip2addr(&auth_request->remote_ip);
	tab[7].value = dec2str(auth_request->client_pid);
	if (auth_request->mech_password != NULL) {
		tab[8].value = escape_func(auth_request->mech_password,
					   auth_request);
	}
	if (auth_request->userdb_lookup) {
		tab[9].value = auth_request->userdb == NULL ? "" :
			dec2str(auth_request->userdb->userdb->id);
	} else {
		tab[9].value = auth_request->passdb == NULL ? "" :
			dec2str(auth_request->passdb->passdb->id);
	}
	tab[10].value = auth_request->mech_name == NULL ? "" :
		escape_func(auth_request->mech_name, auth_request);
	tab[11].value = auth_request->secured ? "secured" : "";
	tab[12].value = dec2str(auth_request->local_port);
	tab[13].value = dec2str(auth_request->remote_port);
	tab[14].value = auth_request->valid_client_cert ? "valid" : "";

	if (auth_request->requested_login_user != NULL) {
		const char *login_user = auth_request->requested_login_user;

		tab[15].value = escape_func(login_user, auth_request);
		tab[16].value = escape_func(t_strcut(login_user, '@'),
					    auth_request);
		tab[17].value = strchr(login_user, '@');
		if (tab[17].value != NULL) {
			tab[17].value = escape_func(tab[17].value+1,
						    auth_request);
		}
	}
	tab[18].value = auth_request->session_id == NULL ? NULL :
		escape_func(auth_request->session_id, auth_request);
	if (auth_request->real_local_ip.family != 0)
		tab[19].value = net_ip2addr(&auth_request->real_local_ip);
	if (auth_request->real_remote_ip.family != 0)
		tab[20].value = net_ip2addr(&auth_request->real_remote_ip);
	tab[21].value = dec2str(auth_request->real_local_port);
	tab[22].value = dec2str(auth_request->real_remote_port);
	tab[23].value = strchr(auth_request->user, '@');
	if (tab[23].value != NULL) {
		tab[23].value = escape_func(t_strcut(tab[23].value+1, '@'),
					    auth_request);
	}
	tab[24].value = strrchr(auth_request->user, '@');
	if (tab[24].value != NULL)
		tab[24].value = escape_func(tab[24].value+1, auth_request);
	tab[25].value = auth_request->master_user == NULL ? NULL :
		escape_func(auth_request->master_user, auth_request);
	tab[26].value = auth_request->session_pid == (pid_t)-1 ? NULL :
		dec2str(auth_request->session_pid);

	orig_user = auth_request->original_username != NULL ?
		auth_request->original_username : auth_request->user;
	tab[27].value = escape_func(orig_user, auth_request);
	tab[28].value = escape_func(t_strcut(orig_user, '@'), auth_request);
	tab[29].value = strchr(orig_user, '@');
	if (tab[29].value != NULL)
		tab[29].value = escape_func(tab[29].value+1, auth_request);

	if (auth_request->master_user != NULL)
		auth_user = auth_request->master_user;
	else
		auth_user = orig_user;
	tab[30].value = escape_func(auth_user, auth_request);
	tab[31].value = escape_func(t_strcut(auth_user, '@'), auth_request);
	tab[32].value = strchr(auth_user, '@');
	if (tab[32].value != NULL)
		tab[32].value = escape_func(tab[32].value+1, auth_request);
	if (auth_request->local_name != NULL)
		tab[33].value = escape_func(auth_request->local_name, auth_request);
	else
		tab[33].value = "";
	return ret_tab;
}

auth: Don't crash expanding %variables when username isn't set.

This continues the auth-policy fix in
c3d3faa4f72a676e183f34be960cff13a5a725ae


static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryArrayWithLimit(
    TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint32* count, uint32 desttypesize,
    void** value, uint64 maxcount)
{
	int typesize;
	uint32 datasize;
	void* data;
        uint64 target_count64;
	typesize=TIFFDataWidth(direntry->tdir_type);

        target_count64 = (direntry->tdir_count > maxcount) ?
                maxcount : direntry->tdir_count;

	if ((target_count64==0)||(typesize==0))
	{
		*value=0;
		return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
	}
        (void) desttypesize;

        /*
         * As a sanity check, make sure we have no more than a 2GB tag array
         * in either the current data type or the dest data type.  This also
         * avoids problems with overflow of tmsize_t on 32bit systems.
         */
	if ((uint64)(2147483647/typesize)<target_count64)
		return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrSizesan);
	if ((uint64)(2147483647/desttypesize)<target_count64)
		return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrSizesan);

	*count=(uint32)target_count64;
	datasize=(*count)*typesize;
	assert((tmsize_t)datasize>0);
	data=_TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, *count, typesize, "ReadDirEntryArray");
	if (data==0)
		return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrAlloc);
	if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF))
	{
		if (datasize<=4)
			_TIFFmemcpy(data,&direntry->tdir_offset,datasize);
		else
		{
			enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
			uint32 offset = direntry->tdir_offset.toff_long;
			if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
				TIFFSwabLong(&offset);
			err=TIFFReadDirEntryData(tif,(uint64)offset,(tmsize_t)datasize,data);
			if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
			{
				_TIFFfree(data);
				return(err);
			}
		}
	}
	else
	{
		if (datasize<=8)
			_TIFFmemcpy(data,&direntry->tdir_offset,datasize);
		else
		{
			enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
			uint64 offset = direntry->tdir_offset.toff_long8;
			if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
				TIFFSwabLong8(&offset);
			err=TIFFReadDirEntryData(tif,offset,(tmsize_t)datasize,data);
			if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
			{
				_TIFFfree(data);
				return(err);
			}
		}
	}
	*value=data;
	return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}

* libtiff/tif_read.c: add protection against excessive memory
allocation attempts in TIFFReadDirEntryArray() on short files.
Effective for mmap'ed case. And non-mmap'ed case, but restricted
to 64bit builds.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2675


static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
                                  void *ptr)
{
    EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);

    switch(type) {
    case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
        if (actx == NULL)
            actx = ctx->cipher_data
                 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
        if (actx == NULL) {
            EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
            return 0;
        }
        actx->len.aad = 0;
        actx->len.text = 0;
        actx->aad = 0;
        actx->mac_inited = 0;
        actx->tag_len = 0;
        actx->nonce_len = 12;
        actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
        memset(actx->tls_aad, 0, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
        return 1;

    case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
        if (actx) {
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dst = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;

            dst->cipher_data =
                   OPENSSL_memdup(actx, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
            if (dst->cipher_data == NULL) {
                EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_COPY_ERROR);
                return 0;
            }
        }
        return 1;

    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
        if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
            return 0;
        actx->nonce_len = arg;
        return 1;

    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
        if (arg != 12)
            return 0;
        actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1]
                       = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr);
        actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2]
                       = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+4);
        actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3]
                       = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+8);
        return 1;

    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
        if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
            return 0;
        if (ptr != NULL) {
            memcpy(actx->tag, ptr, arg);
            actx->tag_len = arg;
        }
        return 1;

    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
        if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE || !ctx->encrypt)
            return 0;
        memcpy(ptr, actx->tag, arg);
        return 1;

    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
        if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
            return 0;
        {
            unsigned int len;
            unsigned char *aad = ptr;

            memcpy(actx->tls_aad, ptr, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN);
            len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 |
                  aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1];
            aad = actx->tls_aad;
            if (!ctx->encrypt) {
                if (len < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
                    return 0;
                len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;     /* discount attached tag */
                aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
                aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1] = (unsigned char)len;
            }
            actx->tls_payload_length = len;

            /*
             * merge record sequence number as per RFC7905
             */
            actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0];
            actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad);
            actx->key.counter[3] = actx->nonce[2] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad+4);
            actx->mac_inited = 0;

            return POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;         /* tag length */
        }

    case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
        /* no-op */
        return 1;

    default:
        return -1;
    }
}

Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305

ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.

It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.

Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.

Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.

CVE-2019-1543

Fixes #8345

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)

(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)


static int smtp_command_parse_parameters(struct smtp_command_parser *parser)
{
	const unsigned char *p, *mp;
	uoff_t max_size = (parser->auth_response ?
		parser->limits.max_auth_size :
		parser->limits.max_parameters_size);

	/* We assume parameters to match textstr (HT, SP, Printable US-ASCII).
	   For command parameters, we also accept valid UTF-8 characters.
	 */
	p = parser->cur + parser->state.poff;
	while (p < parser->end) {
		unichar_t ch;
		int nch = 1;

		if (parser->auth_response)
			ch = *p;
		else {
			nch = uni_utf8_get_char_n(p, (size_t)(p - parser->end),
						  &ch);
		}
		if (nch < 0) {
			smtp_command_parser_error(parser,
				SMTP_COMMAND_PARSE_ERROR_BAD_COMMAND,
				"Invalid UTF-8 character in command parameters");
			return -1;
		}
		if ((parser->auth_response || (ch & 0x80) == 0x00) &&
		    !smtp_char_is_textstr((unsigned char)ch))
			break;
		p += nch;
	}
	if (max_size > 0 && (uoff_t)(p - parser->cur) > max_size) {
		smtp_command_parser_error(parser,
			SMTP_COMMAND_PARSE_ERROR_LINE_TOO_LONG,
			"%s line is too long",
			(parser->auth_response ?
				"AUTH response" : "Command"));
		return -1;
	}
	parser->state.poff = p - parser->cur;
	if (p == parser->end)
		return 0;

	/* In the interest of improved interoperability, SMTP receivers SHOULD
	   tolerate trailing white space before the terminating <CRLF>.

	   WSP =  SP / HTAB ; white space

	   --> Trim the end of the buffer
	 */
	mp = p;
	if (mp > parser->cur) {
		while (mp > parser->cur && (*(mp-1) == ' ' || *(mp-1) == '\t'))
			mp--;
	}

	if (!parser->auth_response && mp > parser->cur && *parser->cur == ' ') {
		smtp_command_parser_error(parser,
			SMTP_COMMAND_PARSE_ERROR_BAD_COMMAND,
			"Duplicate space after command name");
		return -1;
	}

	parser->state.cmd_params = i_strdup_until(parser->cur, mp);
	parser->cur = p;
	parser->state.poff = 0;
	return 1;
}

lib-smtp: smtp-command-parser - Fix infinite loop occurring when command stream ends in UTF-8 character.

Broken by 8f08f1944be438a2422b604c08e5060b5c7bd72f.


rpa_read_buffer(pool_t pool, const unsigned char **data,
		const unsigned char *end, unsigned char **buffer)
{
	const unsigned char *p = *data;
	unsigned int len;

	if (p > end)
		return 0;

	len = *p++;
	if (p + len > end)
		return 0;

	*buffer = p_malloc(pool, len);
	memcpy(*buffer, p, len);

	*data += 1 + len;

	return len;
}

auth: mech-rpa - Fail on zero len buffer


int setup_tests(void)
{
    ADD_ALL_TESTS(call_run_cert, OSSL_NELEM(name_fns));
    return 1;
}

Add a test for GENERAL_NAME_cmp

Based on a boringssl test contributed by David Benjamin

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>


EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
{
    int ok = 0, tmp;
    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL, *dup = NULL;
    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
    long field_bits;
    int curve_name = NID_undef;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
        !params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    /*
     * Now extract the curve parameters a and b. Note that, although SEC 1
     * specifies the length of their encodings, historical versions of OpenSSL
     * encoded them incorrectly, so we must accept any length for backwards
     * compatibility.
     */
    if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a ||
        !params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b ||
        !params->curve->b->data) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }
    a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL);
    if (a == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL);
    if (b == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    /* get the field parameters */
    tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType);
    if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
    {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
        goto err;
    }
#else
    {
        X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;

        char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two;

        field_bits = char_two->m;
        if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
            goto err;
        }

        if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto err;
        }

        /* get the base type */
        tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type);

        if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
            long tmp_long;

            if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
                goto err;
            }

            tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis);

            if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) {
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS,
                      EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS);
                goto err;
            }

            /* create the polynomial */
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
                goto err;
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long))
                goto err;
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
                goto err;
        } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
            X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta;

            penta = char_two->p.ppBasis;
            if (!penta) {
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
                goto err;
            }

            if (!
                (char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2
                 && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) {
                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS,
                      EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS);
                goto err;
            }

            /* create the polynomial */
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
                goto err;
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1))
                goto err;
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2))
                goto err;
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3))
                goto err;
            if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
                goto err;
        } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
            goto err;
        } else {                /* error */

            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }

        /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
        ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL);
    }
#endif
    else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
        /* we have a curve over a prime field */
        /* extract the prime number */
        if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
        p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL);
        if (p == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
            goto err;
        }

        if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
            goto err;
        }

        field_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
        if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
            goto err;
        }

        /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
        ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL);
    } else {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
        goto err;
    }

    if (ret == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    /* extract seed (optional) */
    if (params->curve->seed != NULL) {
        OPENSSL_free(ret->seed);
        if ((ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length)) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto err;
        }
        memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data,
               params->curve->seed->length);
        ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length;
    }

    if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL)
        goto err;

    /* set the point conversion form */
    EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t)
                                       (params->base->data[0] & ~0x01));

    /* extract the ec point */
    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data,
                            params->base->length, NULL)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    /* extract the order */
    if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
        goto err;
    }
    if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
        goto err;
    }

    /* extract the cofactor (optional) */
    if (params->cofactor == NULL) {
        BN_free(b);
        b = NULL;
    } else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    /* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */
    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    /*
     * Check if the explicit parameters group just created matches one of the
     * built-in curves.
     *
     * We create a copy of the group just built, so that we can remove optional
     * fields for the lookup: we do this to avoid the possibility that one of
     * the optional parameters is used to force the library into using a less
     * performant and less secure EC_METHOD instead of the specialized one.
     * In any case, `seed` is not really used in any computation, while a
     * cofactor different from the one in the built-in table is just
     * mathematically wrong anyway and should not be used.
     */
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((dup = EC_GROUP_dup(ret)) == NULL
            || EC_GROUP_set_seed(dup, NULL, 0) != 1
            || !EC_GROUP_set_generator(dup, point, a, NULL)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid_from_params(dup, ctx)) != NID_undef) {
        /*
         * The input explicit parameters successfully matched one of the
         * built-in curves: often for built-in curves we have specialized
         * methods with better performance and hardening.
         *
         * In this case we replace the `EC_GROUP` created through explicit
         * parameters with one created from a named group.
         */
        EC_GROUP *named_group = NULL;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
        /*
         * NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 and NID_secp224r1 are both aliases for
         * the same curve, we prefer the SECP nid when matching explicit
         * parameters as that is associated with a specialized EC_METHOD.
         */
        if (curve_name == NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12)
            curve_name = NID_secp224r1;
#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) */

        if ((named_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_name)) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
        EC_GROUP_free(ret);
        ret = named_group;

        /*
         * Set the flag so that EC_GROUPs created from explicit parameters are
         * serialized using explicit parameters by default.
         */
        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);

        /*
         * If the input params do not contain the optional seed field we make
         * sure it is not added to the returned group.
         *
         * The seed field is not really used inside libcrypto anyway, and
         * adding it to parsed explicit parameter keys would alter their DER
         * encoding output (because of the extra field) which could impact
         * applications fingerprinting keys by their DER encoding.
         */
        if (params->curve->seed == NULL) {
            if (EC_GROUP_set_seed(ret, NULL, 0) != 1)
                goto err;
        }
    }

    ok = 1;

 err:
    if (!ok) {
        EC_GROUP_free(ret);
        ret = NULL;
    }
    EC_GROUP_free(dup);

    BN_free(p);
    BN_free(a);
    BN_free(b);
    EC_POINT_free(point);

    BN_CTX_free(ctx);

    return ret;
}

Fix EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters to check the base length

Check that there's at least one byte in params->base before trying to
read it.

CVE-2021-3712

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>